Bolivia's Emergency Social Fund (ESF) represented one of the first World Bankfunded efforts to address the social costs of adjustment through creating a separate compensatory program, rather than by modifying the implementation of a structural adjustment program in light of the expected social costs. Although the primary emphasis of this program was to provide temporary employment opportunities, it differed from more typical government works projects in several important ways. First, the program was intended to be demand-driven. The management team of the ESF approved or rejected funding requests for small-scale, labor-intensive projects that came from local governmental and nongovernmental agencies, but did not propose any projects themselves. Second, the ESF did not directly employ the workers. Rather, the projects were executed and the workers hired by private subcontractors working under the supervision of the local agency and the central management team of the ESF.
Bolivia's Emergency Social Fund (ESF) represented one of the first World Bankfunded efforts to address the social costs of adjustment through creating a separate compensatory program, rather than by modifying the implementation of a structural adjustment program in light of the expected social costs. Although the primary emphasis of this program was to provide temporary employment opportunities, it differed from more typical government works projects in several important ways. First, the program was intended to be demand-driven. The management team of the ESF approved or rejected funding requests for small-scale, labor-intensive projects that came from local governmental and nongovernmental agencies, but did not propose any projects themselves. Second, the ESF did not directly employ the workers. Rather, the projects were executed and the workers hired by private subcontractors working under the supervision of the local agency and the central management team of the ESF. Third, the ESF was established explicitly as a temporary financial institution outside of the normal bureaucratic structure of the government.
There are several avenues through which a compensatory program such as the would have been considerably lower without the ESF; several donors have begun or resumed programs in Bolivia because the ESF was able to ensure efficient and speedy implementation. In addition, the ESF'S administrative costs amounted to no more than 3 percent of its budget, and the average lag between dates of commitment and disbursement of all funds was less than one year in the ESF, shorter than even fast-disbursing balance of payments support. The ESF was effective in making resources available to municipalities, community organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) , which, because of their size, do not typically receive funding from international organizations. By the end of 1988, the ESF had committed about $20 million or 20 percent of its total commitments to NGOS.
Despite the initial view of the ESF's role, the viability of social investment funds and the benefits of a program like the ESF cannot be judged solely on the basis of the administrative record. The administrative record provides a measure only of the inputs (the expenditure of the investment fund) and not the outputs of the investment fund. Moreover, it remains an open question whether the success the ESF has had as a temporary institution operating to a large extent independently of the line ministries and outside of many normal constraints can be replicated in a permanent institutional framework. The experience that will come with the successor to the ESF in Bolivia (the Social Investment Fund) and with social investment funds elsewhere will be a strong test of the institutional viability of a permanent social investment fund.
Judging the effectiveness of the ESF'S institutional structure, its role in compensating those adversely affected by the structural adjustment, and its contribution toward protecting the poor during adjustment necessitates information on the outputs of the program-the value of the infrastructure created and the impact of the program on beneficiaries. Grosh (1990) describes evaluations of some facets of the ESF that have been conducted, including (a) a technical audit of the technical and engineering quality of its civil works; (b) an early evaluation and monitoring report conducted by a team of economists and sociologists; (c) a community participation study conducted by anthropologists through openended but structured interviews; (d) an ex post cost-benefit analysis of a small sample of completed projects; (e) a study of the macroeconomic impact, which compares the results of investing through the ESF with results from investing through alternative channels; (f) a study of the impact on institutions with which the ESF worked; (g) a study of its impact on one particular community; and (h) a study on the geographic targeting of projects.
This article is concerned with measuring the impact of the ESF program on the employment and income of workers in the ESF projects. Two aspects of the ESF'S effect that are not addressed in this article are worth mentioning. First, given the relatively small size of the ESF program, we do not estimate spillover effects of the program on the urban labor market in general. Second, we are not concerned here with estimating the value of the economic infrastructure created (see Herrick 1989 for a benefit-cost analysis of the infrastructure created). Neverthe-less, it is important to recognize that some of the objectives of the program not evaluated here, namely, to generate productive economic infrastructure and to generate and disburse funds quickly, imposed constraints on the extent of employment generation and income maintenance that resulted from the ESF. For example, because economic infrastructure projects were managed by subcontractors who decided whom to hire, almost no women were hired. This is not surprising because these were construction projects and extremely few women work in the urban construction sector in Bolivia. If the infrastructure output of this employment and income maintenance program is highly valued, then it may still be appropriate to fund such projects even though the mix of the workers hired does not match the desired targets.
Our analysis of the effect of the ESF projects on employment and incomes is based on the results of a survey administered to workers in ESF infrastructure projects and to the population at large by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica of Bolivia. In the first part of the article we identify the characteristics of the workers in the ESF infrastructure projects and compare these workers with the population in general and workers in the construction sector in particular. In the second part of the article we perform a counterfactual simulation, asking what would have been the position of the ESF workers without the ESF program. Based on this simulation, we infer the employment and income effect of the ESF program on its beneficiaries.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE ESF
The Bolivian economy deteriorated rapidly and continuously after 1980, reaching a point of chaos by 1985. In retrospect, the causes are clear. In the 1970s, an artificial boom, fed by capital inflows, followed the discovery of substantial hydrocarbon resources. The boom lasted as long as access to foreign financial resources was easy. When capital inflows slowed in 1980, economic performance deteriorated sharply: net foreign transfers became strongly negative, gross domestic product (GDP) fell in real terms, and capital flight accelerated. Economic policies became erratic and inconsistent. By September 1985, inflation had reached 24,000 percent a year, real GDP per capita had fallen by more than a fifth since 1980, and public sector deficits were about one-fourth of
GDP.
When the government of President Paz-Estenssoro took office in August 1985, an orthodox, wide-ranging stabilization package was introduced. The package freed most prices, deregulated the trade system and the labor market, established a uniform exchange rate (determined through daily auctions), and cut public sector deficits. Inflation was immediately curtailed and has remained low; inflation was 11 percent in 1987 and 21 percent in 1988 and 1989. Public sector deficits have been brought under control, and the exchange rate has remained unified. Growth was impeded by serious negative terms of trade shocks in the first year of the program, but the economy grew slowly in 1987, 1988, and 1989 .
The effects of the economic program on the public sector were especially dramatic. The government set out to fundamentally change the role of the public sector. The public sector's new role was to efficiently provide basic public services, engage in only limited extraction and processing of natural resources, and provide a "level playing field" for the private sector. The state mining sector was closed for restructuring, and 90 percent of its employees were fired. Public sector salary policy was left to individual departments to determine under a fixed wage bill, and the accounting and control system in the public sector was reformed.
From the outset of the adjustment program, the Bolivian government attached a high priority to preventing any further deterioration in social conditions. This was the result not only of concerns over the effect of economic dislocation on the already very low living standards of the Bolivian poor, but also of fear that increased hardship would strengthen opposition to the government's policies. Several plans were considered for alleviating the social costs of adjustment before deciding on the ESF. The early discussions in 1985 revolved around more traditional programs of widespread distribution of food or medicines, or direct subsidies for selected items. These approaches presented a number of difficulties. First, the administrative cost of directly providing or subsidizing the purchase of commodities to low-income groups would be high. Second, providing free food (particularly if taken from international donations) would discourage domestic food production and increase the country's dependence on food imports. Third, permitting recipients more discretion in the use of assistance (providing money instead of food, for example) would be more consistent with the new reduced role of the state. Fourth, the government did not wish to impose a uniform method of assistance, but rather to respond to the demands of local groups that would be in a better position to evaluate the most immediate needs.
In answer to these concerns about traditional programs, the ESF was established in November 1986 to provide funds for small-scale, labor-intensive projects, mostly in infrastructure. The program was to be demand-driven, meaning that the ESF would finance projects proposed by local groups. The focus on labor-intensive, infrastructure projects was adopted to increase employment among the poor while at the same time providing services to the community that would aid development. The ESF was primarily a financing institution. It was not involved in implementing projects, except for some supervision and technical support. The organizations that received funding were responsible for hiring workers and ensuring that projects moved toward completion.
The ESF was designed as a temporary institution, scheduled to disappear in December 1990. It was hoped that in four years' time growth would have picked up enough to solve the employment problem, and the need for austerity mea-sures would be lessened, which would allow increases in social spending as part of the regular budget. The ESF'S total program was planned as $180 million over the life of the institution, with $8 million coming from the Bolivian government and the rest from external sources in the form of grants or loans at concessional rates.
The ESF funds projects in four basic categories: economic infrastructure, social infrastructure, social assistance, and production support. Economic infrastructure (amounting to 37.8 percent of committed funds) encompasses infrastructure closely related to productive activities, including road maintenance and upgrading, urban improvement, irrigation, flood control, and reforestation. Social infrastructure (47.6 percent of committed funds) covers infrastructure for health and education, water and sanitation, basic housing (mostly selfconstruction), and some cultural projects (for example, repairs of historic buildings). Social assistance (8.8 percent of committed funds) covers recurrent costs in education and training, vaccinations, school breakfasts, and production of school materials. Production support (5.7 percent of committed funds) is mainly credit provided through ngos to productive units that are outside of the formal financial system, such as microenterprises producing for the informal sector and small cooperatives in mining and agriculture.
II. THE DATA
The ESF management team commissioned ex post evaluations of the economic returns of the projects and surveys of the beneficiaries of the employmentgenerating projects. Information on ESF workers was obtained from a special survey conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. Information on the general population was obtained from the 1988 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, part of a continuing survey that has been conducted yearly by the Instituto since 1976. The 1988 Encuesta survey took place in May and covered urban households in nine provincial capitals. For the ESF survey, the Instituto selected all projects in execution that were in capital cities, in operation at the time of the Encuesta survey, and in economic infrastructure (that is, explicitly employment-generating). A total of sixty-four projects employing 3,051 workers met these requirements. The Instituto staff then visited the projects to determine the actual number of workers employed at the projects and drew a random sample of 600 workers from the list of all workers. The ESF workers were visited in their homes and were administered the same household questionnaire as that of the Encuesta sample. Table 1 indicates the distribution of all workers in the sixty-four projects and of the sample across all cities.
ESF workers were surveyed separately for two reasons. First, at the time of the survey the number of ESF workers was small, so the probability of finding a sample of ESF workers sufficiently large for analytical work in a sample of the general population was low. The 3,051 ESF workers in the capital cities constituted just 0.3 percent of the economically active population and 2.7 percent of the 
III. ESF WORKERS: CHARACTERISTICS, EARNINGS, HOURS WORKED, AND WAGES
The workers in these ESF projects are, for the most part, prime-age married males who are heads of households. Ninety-nine percent are male, and 71 percent are married. Ninety-one percent are between twenty and sixty-five years old, and 93 percent are reported as head of the household. These workers are the primary income earners in their households, and the earnings from the ESF projects are their main source of income. In 62 percent of the ESF households there is only one reported income earner, in 25 percent there are two, and in 9 percent there are three. Only 7.2 percent of the ESF workers have a secondary job.
Most of the ESF projects in the capital cities are in the construction sector, and 91 percent of the ESF workers work in construction. This percentage is high because of the selection of only projects in economic and social infrastructure. We compare the ESF workers with other workers in the construction sector and with workers in general, using information from the Encuesta sample. Compared with other workers in the construction sector, ESF workers are less educated. The distribution over the different educational levels is given in table 2.
Thirty-nine percent of the sample responded that they were looking for work before working in the ESF project, whereas 54 percent reported that they had a job before joining. Of those who had a job, 60 percent worked in construction, either as an independent or wage worker. That is, a little over 30 percent of all Estadistica (1988a Estadistica ( , 1988b .
those working in ESF projects were working on construction jobs before working on the ESF projects.
Although the ESF workers have low skills relative to the average construction laborer, their mean monthly earnings of 225 bolivianos (Bs225) exceeded those of other low-skilled construction workers in the Encuesta sample (Bs194). Mean monthly earnings were Bs375 for the average prime-age male construction worker in the Encuesta sample, and Bs348 for the average prime-age male in the population at large. The median monthly earnings were Bs194 for workers in ESF projects, Bs220 for prime-age males in the construction sector, and Bs230 for prime-age males in the population in general. Figure 1 presents the distribution of ESF workers across the deciles of monthly earnings of males 18 to 65 years old in the construction industry. Figure 2 presents a similar distribution of ESF workers across the monthly earnings deciles of all males 18 to 65 years old in the Encuesta sample. The height of the bars indicates the percentage of ESF workers with monthly earnings that would place them in the given decile in the Encuesta sample. For example, in figure 1, 11 percent of the ESF workers receive monthly earnings that place them in the poorest decile of construction workers. Compared with both construction workers and urban workers in the Encuesta sample, ESF workers tend to be overrepresented in the third and fourth poorest deciles and severely underrepresented in the richest deciles. Although the earnings of all ESF workers are low relative to earnings in other countries, figures 1 and 2 illustrate that not all the workers in the ESF projects are low-income workers by the standards of the urban Bolivian work force. Similarly, data on the distribution of family income of ESF workers indicates that ESF families fall disproportionately in deciles 3 through 6 and are underrepresented in the lower and upper deciles.
The workers in the ESF projects work more hours, on average, than the primeage males in the Encuesta sample: 50.3 hours a week compared with 46.8 for the Encuesta workers. Compared with other prime-age males in the construction sector and the population in general, the distribution of hours worked by ESF workers is less variable, with 56 percent of the workers working 46-50 hours a week, and 95 percent working more than 40 hours a week. In the Encuesta sample, 39 percent worked 46-50 hours a week, and 77 percent worked more than 40 hours. Note: Decile ranges are calculated from all workers' earnings (Encuesta sample).
Source:Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (1988a Estadistica ( , 1988b . The mean hourly wage of workers in the ESF projects was Bsl.16 compared with a mean hourly wage of Bs2.28 for all construction workers in the Encuesta sample. The median hourly wage is BsO.98 for ESF workers and Bsl.29 in the Encuesta sample. Table 3 presents the distribution of ESF families by family earnings and food expenditure. In general, the ESF families appear to be worse off if judged by their position within food expenditure quartiles as opposed to family earnings quartiles. For example, 34.6 percent of the ESF families are in the lowest food expenditure quartile, whereas only 21.5 percent of the ESF families are in the lowest family earnings quartile. And 17 percent of the families are in the highest two earnings quartiles and the lowest two food expenditure quartiles. Although it is possible that measurement error in either food expenditure or family earnings resulted in a misclassification of some families into the wrong cell, the observed relation between expenditure and income is what one would expect given the temporary nature of ESF jobs. The ESF families may not have changed their expenditure patterns in response to the temporary gain in income, so that movement into a higher earnings quartile was not accompanied by movement into a higher food expenditure quartile.
Eleven percent of the families in the lower two earnings quartiles are in the highest two food expenditure quartiles. The workers in this group may have come from relatively well-off households, because low earnings did not lead the household to have low food expenditure; they may have drawn on other financial resources that were not reported in the survey. The families who are in both the high earnings and the high food expenditure quartiles (17.8 percent) may have been relatively well-off households to begin with, or the high earnings may have raised the households' food expenditure. With limited information on the household characteristics of ESF workers, we can not tell which is the more likely explanation.
IV. IMPACT OF THE ESF PROGRAM
To ascertain the effect of the ESF on the labor market, we ask a counterfactual question: what would have been the position of the ESF workers and other individuals in the labor market without the program? In principle, the positions of both types of workers could be estimated by holding constant local labor market conditions (the size and structure of demand) and estimating the incremental effect of the ESF program on wage offers. Because the ESF increases the demand for labor, one would expect it to increase the level of wages offered, the probability of working, and hours worked. To infer the effect on workers of the ESF program, one would compare expected wages, probabilities of working, and hours worked with the incremental effect of the ESF program with the corresponding values obtained by setting the incremental effect to zero.
Such a procedure requires an accurate indicator of the size of the ESF program in the different capital cities. At the time of the survey, there was substantial variation both in local labor market conditions and in the size of the ESF program. The variation in the ESF program, however, was not random. The actual size of the program reflected the number and size of proposals that were received from each city and the funding decision rules of the ESF'S management team. The management team attempted to fund projects in cities where wages were low and where unemployment and underemployment were high. Because of this nonrandom allocation, the inclusion of a direct measure of ESF size (for example, the number of ESF workers or expenditure in each city) would generate biased estimates of the program's effect. The ESF measure would be correlated with the error terms in the equations explaining wages and labor force participation because of its correlation with unobserved local labor market conditions. This is a common problem in evaluating government programs (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986) and is typically solved by incorporating information on the program implementation to distinguish between the effects of the allocation and the impact of the program. Evaluating a demand-driven program such as the ESF can be even more difficult than the typical case if the applications for the projects are correlated with the variables of interest. If the applications and other variables are uncorrelated (as would be the case if the underlying capacity to generate proposals was randomly distributed across cities), then information on the applications could serve as an instrument for the size of the ESF program. No additional information on the decision rules would be needed. If the initial applications are not randomly distributed across the cities, however, then even knowledge of the management's decision rules may not overcome the problem of a nonrandom allocation of the ESF program. Additional information would have to be available on the ability of a city to generate fundable proposals.
Our attempts to measure the incremental effect of the ESF program using the dollar amount of applications in each city as an instrument for the size of the program were unsuccessful. The ESF applications were in fact highly correlated with the population and unemployment rate in the city. Consequently, it proved impossible to measure any spillover benefits of the ESF program on other workers who do not participate in the program. Given, however, that the total amount of workers employed in capital cities at the time of the survey amounted to just 0.3 percent of the economically active population and 2.7 percent of the total unemployed, any spillover effects would be expected to be minimal. Thus we focus exclusively on measuring the benefits of the ESF program to the workers who participate in the program.
The Econometric Specification
We estimate the workers' expected gains from participating in the ESF program using two models. Both are based on Heckman's (1974) model describing the determination of wages, the probability of working, and the hours of work (see also Amemiya 1985, pp. 391-93 ). Our first model consists of four equations that describe wage offers in the general population, the marginal value of leisure of individuals in the general population, wage offers in the ESF, and the marginal value of leisure of ESF workers. In this model, we assume that the errors in the equations for the general population are independent of the errors in the equations for the ESF. This implies that ESF workers differ from those in the general population only in their observed characteristics, not in unobserved characteristics, and it allows us to estimate the wage-offer and marginal-value-of-leisure equations separately for each group.
Given the characteristics of the workers and the labor market (city) they are in, one may calculate wages, hours of work, earnings, and the probability of working from the estimated structural equations. An estimate of the workers' expected gains from participating in the ESF program is then obtained by comparing the expected wages, hours of work, and earnings while participating in the program with estimates of what they would have been without it. Under the assumptions of this first model, the counterfactual wage offers and marginal values of leisure are obtained by inserting the characteristics of the ESF workers into the estimated wage-offer and marginal-value-of-leisure equations of the general population.
A problem with this model is that ESF workers may differ from individuals in the general population in ways that are not captured by their observed characteristics. That these workers chose to participate in the ESF indicates they perceived working in the ESF to be better than their alternatives and, therefore, suggests that they might be different from the general population. Our second model takes this into consideration in estimating what the ESF workers would receive without the program. It adds an equation determining participation in the ESF and allows the error terms in the participation equation to be correlated with the errors in the wage-offer and marginal-value-of-leisure equations of ESF workers and the general population.
In this section we briefly describe the estimation procedure for the first, simpler model. The second, more complicated model is explained in the appendix.
The equation describing wage offers in the general population, wo, is
where X 1 is a vector of explanatory variables, and ul is a random error term. Wage offers are assumed not to depend on the hours of work, although this assumption could be relaxed. Again, correlation between U 3 and U 4 is allowed.
Because everyone who participates in the ESF works, we do not have to consider their decision whether or not to work. We do have to consider this decision for those in the general population, however. An individual in the general population will work if the offered wage is greater than the marginal value of leisure evaluated at zero hours of work, often referred to as the reservation wage:
or, substituting from equation 1 and rearranging, if
Individuals who work will do so up to the point at which the marginal value of leisure is equal to the wage offer. The wage and hours worked are determined by solving equations 1 and 2 simultaneously with the condition that or, solving equation 9 for hours of work,
Provided there are variables that affect the marginal value of leisure that do not also affect wage offers, all structural parameters of the model (given by equations 8 and 9) are identified. The model was estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. The princi-ple behind this estimation method is to choose values for the population parameters that maximize the probability of having observed the actual sample drawn. Once an assumption is made about the distribution of the error terms (u 1 , u 2 , U 3 , U 4 ), it is possible to write down a likelihood function that gives the probability of observing the actual sample in terms of the parameters to be estimated. The parameter estimates that maximize the likelihood function are then found by an iterative numerical procedure. The likelihood function for the general population, L, is
where u2 = -(l/'y)u 2 , UB = Zl a -X1 1, 2v is a dummy of integration, and P ,2 is the correlation between u 1 and u 2 . The product over 0 consists of all individuals who are not working, and, for each of these individuals,
is the probability that ul -U2 < Z' cl -X1 01, that is, the probability that equation 6 does not hold and the individual does not work. The product over 1 consists of all the individuals who are working, and, for each of these, fu,,4 (.,.) is the probability that the individual works and chooses the observed number of hours. L is thus the probability of drawing the observed sample, given in terms of the population parameters of interest, c1, Ce, 01, al 02, and P 1 2-For the sample of ESF workers, the likelihood function consists only of the product over 1 (with u 3 replacing ul, and u4, defined analogously, replacing us ), because all ESF workers are employed. Indeed, one could just as well estimate the parameters of interest by seemingly unrelated regression to take account of the correlation between u 3 and U 4 .
The variables that affect the marginal value of leisure are age, a dummy variable equal to 1 if married, nonlabor income, years of schooling, and the number of other family members 12 years or older (included as a measure of the total number of potential workers). The variables in the wage-offer function for the general population include age, years of education, the overall unemployment rate in the city of residence, and the size of the market as measured by the number economically active in the city. In lieu of price indices for each city, we include in the wage-offer function a cost factor employed by the ESF management team in setting administrative guidelines on wages paid in ESF projects. The guidelines allowed for paying higher wages where the nominal wage paid in the market was higher. Including the cost factor accounts somewhat for these differences but does not allow one to distinguish whether nominal wages are higher because the price level is higher or because the demand for labor is higher. This is not important for the purposes of this article. Because the ESF jobs considered here are exclusively in construction, the wage-offer function for ESF jobs is made a function of the unemployment rate in the construction sector instead of the unemployment rate of the economy as a whole. All other variables in the wageoffer functions are the same. The means of all the explanatory variables for males 18 to 55 years old in the ESF sample and in the general population are presented in table 4.
As discussed above, the second model differs from the first in that it accounts for the determinants of the decision to participate in the ESF. The propensity to participate in the program, Y*, is modeled as a function of a vector of observed exogenous variables, Q, and a random error term, u.. An individual participates in the ESF only if the latent participation variable, Y*, passes a threshold. The propensity is not observable: we only observe the determinants and whether or a. For the general population, the mean log wage and the wage are calculated only for those who work. All other mean values refer to the combined working and nonworking population.
b. For the ESF workers, the unemployment rate is the unemployment rate in construction. For the general population, it is the overall unemployment rate.
c. This is an indicator of market size, measured as the number of the economically active in the city (divided by 100,000,.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (1988a Estadistica ( , 1988b 
Results
Because almost all ESF workers were males 18 to 55 years old, we limited our sample of the general population to males in this age group. We also excluded as outliers from both samples those who reported working more than 350 hours a month and those more than two standard deviations away from the mean n wage. The exclusion criteria reduced the ESF sample by nearly 25 percent and the Encuesta sample by 6 percent. Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients for the restricted and unrestricted models for males 18 to 55 years old in the general population. The simpler restricted model, as discussed previously, has no equation for participation in ESF and therefore implicitly assumes no correlation between errors in the participation equation and the wage offer or marginal value of leisure (P 1 s = P25 = 0). The coefficients of the variables entering the hours-of-work equations were estimated as (lx/yi and 1 2 /Y 2 , respectively. Because estimates of -Yi and Y2 are available, the structural parameters of the marginal value of leisure for both the general population and the ESF workers could be recovered if so desired.
In this sample, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the restrictions are valid, namely that both Pis and P 2 5 are zero. The point estimate of P15 is negative, meaning that those more likely to participate in the ESF are, given their observed characteristics, more likely to have lower wage offers in the general population. This parameter is imprecisely estimated, however, even in this large sample. The point estimate of P25 is small and is also imprecisely estimated. The value of the likelihood function changes only slightly between the two models, and all estimated coefficients are virtually identical. Except for the estimates of P 15 and P 2 5 , all coefficients-are statistically significant at the 5 percent level with the expected signs. The correlation between the error terms in the marginal value of leisure and the log wage equations (P12) is positive, or equivalently, the correlation between the error terms in the equations for the hours of work and the log wage is negative. b. Indicator of market size, measured as the number of the economically active in the city (divided by 100,000).
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (1988a Estadistica ( , 1988b .
The estimated increase in the wage from an additional year of schooling is 5.4 percent. An increase of 1 percent in the unemployment rate would lead to a 3.6 percent decrease in wage offers. The results also indicate that those with more nonlabor income and those in families with more potential workers have a higher marginal value of leisure and will work less. An increase of Bsl,000 a year in nonlabor income decreases hours worked per week by 11. Conversely, marriage and age are associated with higher hours of work. A 1 percent increase in the wage is estimated to lead to an increase of 0.17 hours worked. At the sample unconditional mean of 29 hours, this amounts to a 0.6 percent increase in hours worked. Thus the estimated labor supply elasticity is 0.6.
Although more educated people have higher wage offers, they also have higher marginal values of leisure. Thus the effect of education on hours worked depends on the combined effect. On the one hand, an increase of one year of education increases the log wage by 0.054 which, in turn, increases hours worked by 0.92 hours. On the other hand, an increase of one year of education, acting through its effect on the marginal value of leisure, decreases hours worked by 1.7 hours. An additional year of education, therefore, is associated with a 5.4 percent higher wage in the general labor market and 0.78 hours less work a week. Table 6 presents results of the restricted and unrestricted model for the ESF workers. Because this sample is roughly one-tenth the size of that of the general population, it is not surprising that the coefficients are estimated with less precision. Although the coefficients in the wage-offer equation follow the same pattern as for the general population and are generally precisely estimated, this is not the case for the coefficients in the hours equation. This is undoubtedly because of the much lower variation in hours in the ESF sample. Not only do all ESF workers work, but, also conditional on working, their hours vary less than in the general population.
In contrast to the case with the general population, for the ESF workers we can reject the hypothesis that both p3,5 and p4,5 are equal to zero. The negative P4,5 indicates that those with a larger positive u 5 , who hence are more likely to participate in the ESF, are those with a lower U 4 , and hence a lower marginal value of leisure. This means that those individuals are more likely to work longer hours. One possible explanation is that those individuals well suited to unskilled construction work may be more likely to work in the ESF and have the stamina to work more hours. Alternatively, it may be that those more likely to work in the ESF have a higher marginal utility of income and are prepared to work longer hours. It is, of course, impossible to distinguish among alternative explanations for associations between the unobserved errors.
The estimated coefficients in the wage-offer function do not change dramatically between the restricted and the unrestricted model. As expected, given the low-skilled nature of the construction work, the return to education is only 1.6 percent-considerably lower than in the general population. The coefficients in the hours equation do change considerably between the restricted and the unre- Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (1988a Estadistica ( , 1988b .
stricted model, but, because the restricted model has so little precision, one should not make too much of the changes. The top part of table 7 presents mean expected wage, weekly hours worked, and weekly earnings based on the estimated coefficients from tables 5 and 6. Source: Author's calculations based.on data from Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (1988a Estadistica ( , 1988b .
These expectations are first calculated conditional on working, and then they are multiplied by the predicted probability of working, to yield the unconditional expectations. The mean expected values are calculated for each observation in the sample and then averaged. In a likelihood ratio test of the two models of the ESF workers, the restricted model was rejected in favor of the unrestricted model at the 5 percent level of significance. Thus the expected values of the unrestricted model are the ones to focus on. Because the restricted model for the general population was not rejected, however, we present the results for the restricted model of ESF workers solely for the sake of comparison. The mean expected wage of ESF workers, conditional on working, is Bs1.06 an hour, very close to the actual mean wage in the ESF sample. The mean expected weekly hours conditional on working is considerably higher for the ESF workers than for the general population (49.6 versus 35.4 hours). It is this difference that accounts for the higher mean expected earnings of the ESF workers (Bs52.4 versus Bs46.3 a week). Because all ESF participants work, there is no difference between their conditional and unconditional expectations. The mean probability of working for the general population is 72 percent, however, so that the unconditional expected wage, hours, and earnings of the prime-age males in the general population are correspondingly lower.
The expected position of ESF workers without the program is calculated by replacing the estimated coefficients from the ESF equations with those of the general population and recalculating the expected wage, hours, and weekly earnings. These calculations are presented in the bottom part of table 7. Both the conditional and unconditional wages of ESF workers are lower than those of the comparator population here, but they have a greater probability of being employed (even without the ESF program) than do the comparator population (82 percent) and have a higher expected number of hours worked.
To measure the benefit from working in the ESF, we calculated the difference in expected wage, hours, and earnings for a worker in the ESF and for the worker without the ESF conditional on being employed. This enables us to look not only at the average benefit over all ESF workers, but also at the distribution of the benefits. The average ESF worker experiences increases of 13 percent in wages, 9.5 hours in weekly work, and 35 percent in weekly earnings over expected levels without the ESF. Taking into account the possibility that the individual may not have worked without the ESF leads to larger gains. The unconditional comparison indicates that, for the average ESF worker, wages are 33 percent higher, the work week is 15.5 hours longer, and weekly earnings are 51 percent higher.
An examination of the distribution of gains over all ESF workers indicates that the greatest benefits from participating in the program were received by those who would have been least well-off without the program. We define the least well-off group as those whose estimated conditional wage without the program would have placed them more than one half of a standard deviation below the actual mean wage of prime-age males in the general population. Twenty-five percent of the ESF sample consists of individuals in this group. Participation in the ESF gives this group an absolute increase of BsO.37 an hour in their expected wage (a 64 percent increase), an increase of 20 hours worked, and an absolute increase in earnings of Bs29 a week (a 171 percent increase) over their position if they worked without the ESF. Taking into account the probability that they might not work yields corresponding absolute increases of BsO.57 an hour, 30 hours of work a week, and Bs38 a week.
The next group of ESF workers to be considered consists of those whose estimated conditional wage without the program would have placed them within one-half of a standard deviation (plus or minus) of the actual mean wage of prime-age males in the general population. Seventy-three percent of the sample fall into this category. Because this group has higher wages and earnings than the less well-off group, their percentage gains will be smaller. Conditional on working, the absolute increases for this group are estimated to be BsO.03 a week in wages (a 3 percent increase), 5.7 hours worked, and Bs7.4 in weekly earnings (a 15.9 percent increase). The unconditional comparison yields average increases of BsO.15 an hour, 10.4 hours a week, and Bs16.5 a week.
A further indication of the benefits of participation in the ESF is provided by comparing the estimated wage of workers with the ESF program to the actual Decile of primary earnings
Prime-age males in the general population
ESF workers
Note: Decile ranges calculated from males 18 to 55 years old in the Encuesta sample.
mean wage of prime-age males in the general population ( figure 3 ). With the increased wage received in the ESF program, only 6 percent of the ESF workers are estimated to be in the least well-off group (as defined above), 91 percent of the ESF workers in the middle group, and 3 percent in the highest group. The biggest effect was in moving individuals out of the least well-off category. Because ESF workers in the lowest groups also experienced the largest increase in expected hours worked, their relative benefits in weekly earnings compared with the better-off groups are even larger than their hourly wage gains. ESF workers benefitted in terms of estimated wages and actual earnings. The ESF program resulted in a substantial temporary increase in earnings, with most of the beneficiaries moving out of the lowest deciles toward the middle deciles.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Returning to the four views of the ESF, it is apparent from the administrative records and the survey data that the ESF was more successful in fulfilling some of its promises than others. The ESF generated and rapidly disbursed external funds. To the extent that it successfully transferred these funds to lower-income groups who consume mainly domestically produced goods, the expenditure would be expected to have a larger multiplier effect. It generated substantial temporary gains in earnings of workers in the projects over what they would have received without the program, with the lowest income groups receiving the greatest increases in earnings. Although the ESF did not target the former miners and former public sector employees that are generally considered the ones most affected by the structural adjustment program, it did employ workers that came primarily from the construction industry, which was also hurt by the economic crisis.
To a large extent, the outcomes resulted from the extensive use of existing local institutions and private subcontractors. The success of the ESF depends first on the presence of local institutions capable of preparing projects. ESF experience has indicated that this can be a problem, particularly in low-income areas, and that active promotion on the part of the management team is needed. Working with existing institutions undoubtedly contributed to the ESF'S ability to generate external funds and rapidly disburse them. Once the subcontractors received the funds, it is readily apparent from the Instituto survey that they paid market wages for unskilled construction laborers. This is not surprising because the ESF did not exert control over whom the subcontractors hired, but did judge them on the progress of the project. In this respect the program differs from other temporary employment schemes that aim to be an employer of last resort by offering below-market wages. In those schemes, the quality of the infrastructure created would be expected to be lower.
By virtue of working through the subcontractors, all targeting of benefits takes place in the initial selection of projects. Because unskilled construction workers are low-income individuals, the ESF program succeeded in reaching poorer groups of families. Although these workers are certainly poor by other countries' standards, however, they are not the poorest groups or, necessarily, the groups most adversely affected by the structural adjustment program. These groups would be helped only with this type of demand-driven program if they chose to seek work in the ESF and if the private subcontractors were as willing to hire them as they were to hire more experienced construction workers. It was also to be expected that some subcontractors, faced with the need to meet performance standards on the quality of the projects, would hire workers who were already employed in the construction sector.
The administrative success of the ESF as a temporary financial institution generated interest in replicating the central ideas more permanently and as part of a compensation package in a structural adjustment program. The program's use of private subcontractors was seen to rapidly generate temporary benefits to a mostly low-income group with low administrative costs. The likely effects of a similar program in other countries depends on labor market conditions, the administrative capability of existing ministries, and the strength of local governmental and nongovernmental organizations. For example, a demand-driven program such as the ESF is unlikely to have much effect on unemployment resulting from educated youth waiting for a job in the modern sector. The program is more likely to be a success if there are projects promising high returns using low-skilled workers, if there is unemployment in the construction sector and construction workers are at the low end of the income distribution, and if paying below-market wages is considered undesirable-either because of the potential impact it could have on the quality of the project or because of the administrative costs of monitoring to ensure that low wages are actually paid. If these conditions prevail, as they did in Bolivia, then this type of temporary employment scheme may be a viable alternative to programs in which the government directly hires workers.
APPENDIX
The second model consists of five equations that describe (a) participation in the ESF, (b) Because participation is a zero-one decision, it is not possible to separately identify 6, the coefficients in equation 1, from o 1 . Following the usual practice, we normalize ( 5 to be equal to 1. The covariance among errors in the wage-offer and marginal-value-of-leisure equations of the general population, on the one hand, and among corresponding equations of the ESF (013, 0J14, 023, and 024), on the other hand, cannot be estimated because the individual works either in the ESF or in the general labor market. Thus they are set to zero. Errors in the wageoffer and marginal-value-of-leisure equations in the general population are allowed to be correlated, thereby picking up measurement error between hours and wages. Similarly, errors in the wage-offer and marginal-value-of-leisure equations in the ESF population are allowed to be correlated.
The main difference between this model and the simpler one in the text is that in the text the implicit assumption is made that errors in the equation determining participation in the ESF are uncorrelated with wage offers and marginal values of leisure both in the ESF and in the general population, that is, 015 = a 2 5 = a35 = 0r45 = 0. Under these assumptions, the multivariate normal distribution of the errors collapses to the product of independent distributions: Thus in the first model one may estimate the wage offers and marginal values of leisure in the ESF independently of the participation decision or of the wageoffer and marginal-value-of-leisure equations in the general population.
To allow for the possibility that ESF workers could differ in some unmeasured characteristics from those in the general population, we relax the covariance restrictions of the simpler model. Under a more general covariance structure, those individuals more likely to participate in the ESF could have higher or lower wage offers than the general population. Under the less restrictive assumptions, the distribution of multivariate normal errors is: In the previous case, f (u 1 , u2IuS) was assumed equal to f(u 1 , u 2 ) and f(U3, U41 U 5 ) equal to f(U 3 , U 4 ). Because this is no longer the case, we now must consider the participation decision in order to arrive at the expected wages and earnings of ESF workers without the program. We estimate this model in two steps.
In the first step, we predict the probability that a prime-age male would work in the ESF. Our problem is complicated by having to estimate the participation decision with a combined sample of ESF and Encuesta survey observations, with an overrepresentation of ESF workers. We know that those individuals taken from the ESF sample were program participants. Although there may be some unidentifiable ESF workers in the Encuesta sample, their proportion is so low that we assume their presence does not affect the distribution of workers in the population in any significant way. Thus we consider the Encuesta sample to consist of nonparticipants in the program.
In combining information from the two samples, it is important to recognize that the ESF workers must have chosen to work in the ESF projects at least in part because they viewed that work as preferable to their alternatives. Because the two samples are not distinguished solely on the basis of an exogenous variable such as age, but rather on a choice that was made, we face the problem of analyzing the participation decision using a choice-based sample (see McFadden 1981, and Amemiya 1985, pp. 319-38) . Because we know the size of the ESF program in each of the capital cities, however, we can follow the weighted likelihood function approach of Manski and Lerman (1977) in estimation. In this approach, one weights the log likelihood pertaining to the outcome of each group by the ratio of the probability of encountering a member of a particular group in the population to the probability of drawing a member of that group from the sample.
In the second step, by virtue of the independence of the error terms in the ESF and general population conditional on the participation error f(u 1 , u 2 u 5 ) and f(U 3 , U 4 U 5 ) we can work with the ESF sample separately from that of the popula- Because the conditional means depend upon u 5 , the error term from the participation equation will enter the likelihood function. Because u 5 is not observed, however, it must be integrated out of the likelihood function over its relevant range. From equation A-1, for those who don't participate in the ESF, U 5 < -M2. Thus the relevant range for u 5 is from -X to -6Q. The resulting likelihood function for the general population will now be: As in the estimation of the ESF sample in the simpler model, only the second part of the likelihood function given in equation A-5 would appear for the ESF equations, with U 3 , u 4 substituting for u 1 , u 2 . Because the condition for workers to participate in the ESF iS U 5 > -8(, the limits of integration of u 5 for the ESF workers are from -oQ to co. If p34 were equal to zero, this estimation procedure would be exactly equivalent to Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure of including the estimated value of the Mills ratio as a regressor on single-equation ordinary-least-squares regressions of In WESF and HESF-
